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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
S. LARRY CROOKSTON, RANDI L. 
CROOKSTON, AND ANNA W. DRAKE, 
Trustee of the Estate of 
SPENCER LARRY CROOKSTON and 
RANDI LYNN CROOKSTON, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a 
California corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND CASE HISTORY 
Jurisdiction lies with this Court pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1992). This appeal is taken from 
the Order denying defendant's Motion for New Trial or Remittitur 
entered by the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick presiding, on March 25, 1992. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err in refusing defendant a new trial 
by jury on the issue of punitive damages utilizing the standard 
enunciated in Crookston, et al. v. Fire Ins. Exchange. 817 P. 2d 789 
(Utah 1991)? 
Docket No. 920172 
Category 16 
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Standard of Review; 
The decision of the court to retroactively apply an overruling 
decision is within the discretion of the court and as such will not 
be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. Loyal Order of 
Moose, No. 259 v. County Board, 657 P.2d 257 (Utah 1982). 
2. Did the trial court err in refusing to remit the punitive 
damage award in accordance with the standards set forth in 
Crookston? 
Standard of Review; 
In reviewing a trial court's decision to deny a new trial due 
to an excessive verdict, an appellate court will reverse only if 
there is no reasonable basis for the decision. Crookston v. Fire 
Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 805 (Utah 1991). 
3. Did the trial court err in considering facts not properly 
before it in ruling on defendant's Motion for New Trial or 
Remittitur? 
Standard of Review; 
Whether a piece of evidence is admissible is a question of 
fact. Evidentiary rulings are reviewed under a correctness 
standard. Grayson, Ltd. Partnership v. Finlayson, 782 P. 2d 467, 
470 (Utah 1989) . 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Rule 59 of that Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Due to the 
length of this provision, the text will be set forth in the 
appendix. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case now comes before the Utah Supreme Court for the 
second time. In Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P. 2d 789 
(Utah 1991), this court vacated in part the trial court's denial of 
defendant's Motion for New Trial or Remittitur and remanded the 
action back to the trial court for reconsideration consistent with 
this Court's opinion in Crookston. The underlying facts of this 
case were reviewed in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict 
in this Court's opinion in Crookston. In addition to the facts set 
forth in this Court's opinion and the parties' briefs on file with 
the Court in the first appeal, Docket No. 880034, defendant 
respectfully submits the following additional factual background to 
this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the time of trial, plaintiffs' expert economist, Paul 
Randle, Ph.D., identified the type, extent and nature of damages 
alleged to have been sustained by plaintiffs as a result of defen-
dant's conduct, as follows: 
Loss of equity position in 
property and house $104,817 (R. 838) 
Out-of-pocket expenses1 $ 3,198 (R. 839) 
Bankruptcy costs $ 3,13 9 (R. 839) 
Lost income of Larry Crookston 
due to inability to work as 
part-time janitor (1982-84) $ 31,798 (R. 839-841) 
Identified as consisting of "monies that [plaintiffs] have personally expended in connection with construction on the site, building permits, and taxes, 
utilities, insurance premiums . . . sweat equity . . . and loan fees." (R. 839) 
3 
Lost income of Larry Crookston 
due to failure to obtain nursing 
degree (1984 - time of trial) $ 72,251 (R. 842-844) 
Future loss of income of Larry 
Crookston due to impairment of 
income in his nursing profession 
(time of trial - 1990) $ 83,306 (R. 845) 
Lost past fringe benefits of 
Larry Crookston $ 11,560 (R. 847-848) 
Future loss of fringe benefits 
of Larry Crookston $ 13,300 (R. 848) 
Total $323,3992 
During his testimony, Dr. Randle also testified that it was 
impossible for him to render a precise expert opinion as to any 
hard economic injury allegedly sustained by plaintiffs attributable 
to their having to file bankruptcy. Dr. Randle testified as 
follows: 
Q. Have you attempted to calculate this type 
of economic loss which could be suffered 
by the Crookstons, the type that you have 
described . . .? 
A. I have not. 
Q. Can you do that? 
A. I don't think I can. I guess it might be 
possible, but I have two questions that I 
just don't have the kind of crystal ball 
that allows me to gaze into this aspect 
of their lives and put a dollar value on 
it. It's too speculative for me. (R. 
858-859) 
During the initial appeal brought by defendant, this Court 
affirmed the trial jury's verdict and the trial court's refusal to 
2 
Those damage figures relating to past economic damages as of the time of trial included 10% interest from the time of the alleged damage, some 
of which was sustained in 1982, until the time of trial in 1987 
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grant a new trial or remittitur on the issue of the compensatory 
damages. The original jury verdict was for $815,826 in compen-
satory damages and $4,000,000 in punitive damages. (R. 1543-46) 
In reviewing the trial testimony on the issue of compensatory 
damages, this Court stated: 
[T]estimony at trial attributed $323,399 of 
the $815,82 6 [in compensatory damages awarded 
at trial] to economic loss, making the 
remaining $492,427 apparently attributable to 
emotional distress and loss of financial 
reputation. 
Crookston, 817 P. 2d at 795. The Court also noted that the trial 
court had entered an additional judgment against defendant awarding 
plaintiffs attorney fees of $175,000 and expenses of $11,126. Id. 
The Court, however, vacated the trial court's denial of defendant's 
Motion for New Trial or Remittitur on the issue of punitive damages 
and remanded the action back to the trial court for reconsideration 
consistent with the Court's opinion in Crookston. 
Following the issuance of this Court's opinion in Crookston on 
June 28, 1991, defendant, on July 22, 1991, tendered two cashier's 
checks totaling $1,489,263.14 to plaintiffs and their counsel. 
Said sum was paid in full and complete satisfaction of plaintiffs' 
judgments for compensatory damages, attorney's fees and costs 
against defendant. As a result, all that remains unpaid of plain-
tiffs' judgments against defendant is the $4,000,000 punitive 
damage award. (R. 3044-3045) 
On remand, the parties attempted to negotiate a potential 
settlement of the punitive damage award, but having failed to do so 
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went forward on defendant's Motion for New Trial or Remittitur. 
Following oral argument on the motion on January 31, 1992, the 
trial court issued a 23-page Memorandum Decision on February 10, 
1992, setting forth the reasons for its denial of defendant's 
motion. (R. 3197-3219) Plaintiffs' counsel then prepared a 
proposed order and submitted the same to defendant's counsel. 
Defendant's counsel timely objected to the form of the proposed 
order. (R. 3222-3226) Over the objection of defendant, the trial 
court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
Denying Defendant's Motion for New Trial or in the Alternative 
Remittitur on March 25, 1992. (R. 3238-3242) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This case involves an unprecedented award of $4.0 million in 
punitive damages. The initial jury verdict was rendered with 
"essentially standardless discretion.11 This Court in the first 
appeal of this case, Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P. 2d 
789 (Utah 1991), crafted a new standard for ensuring that punitive 
awards bear a reasonable and rational relationship to other damages 
awarded in a case. The sheer size and disparate relationship 
between the punitive award and the compensatory damages in this 
case demonstrate that the original jury was influenced by passion 
and prejudice. The interests of justice and fair play require that 
a new jury utilizing the Crookston standards be allowed to pass on 
the issue of punitive damages. 
In determining whether the jury's punitive award was unduly 
excessive, this Court has traditionally reviewed verdicts in light 
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of several evidentiary factors. Application of the traditional 
"list of factors" and the standards set forth in Crookston require 
a reduction in the punitive damage award in this case. 
The trial court further committed error in considering on 
remand numerous facts and inferences not properly before the court. 
The trial court erred in considering numerous facts which were 
never introduced into evidence before the original jury. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I, 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 
REFUSING TO PERMIT A NEW JURY TO REASSESS THE 
PUNITIVE DAMAGE ISSUE UNDER THE STANDARDS 
ENUNCIATED BY THIS COURT IN CROOKSTON, 
A. The Original Verdict Was Rendered Under Pre-Crookston 
Standards 
This Court in Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P. 2d 789 
(Utah 1991), acknowledges that the unprecedented $4.0 million 
punitive damage award in this case clearly "exceeds the general 
pattern" established in prior Utah cases. Id. at 807. In 
Crookston, the Court also notes the numerous problems which are 
created by giving finders of fact "essentially standardless 
discretion" to award punitive damages. Id. at 809. The original 
jury verdict rendered in this case was the product of such a 
"standardless" standard. 
In vacating the trial court's order denying defendant's Motion 
for New Trial or Remittitur, this Court observed at least the 
following deficiencies in the punitive damage "standard" utilized 
by the jury in this case: 
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"[A] review of our case law in punitive damages has 
left us dissatisfied with articulated standards for 
determining the amount of such awards." Id. at 
808. 
"These standards provide little guidance for . . . 
a jury fixing the punitive damages . . .." Id. 
"The stated list of factors we have said must be 
considered in assessing the amount of punitives to 
be awarded include the following . . . . Our cases 
have done little more than list these factors. No 
relative weights have been assigned them, and no 
standards or formulas have been established for 
properly evaluating them when making an award or 
when reviewing the propensity of a jury award. 
This makes such an enterprise highly problematic 
for judge and jury. The finder of fact has no 
guidance on how much weight to give each factor or 
even how the factors should be assessed. And 
nothing suggests to the jury or the trial court 
that there is any sort of limit or ceiling on an 
award." Id. 
"[Q]uite predictably, the bases for awards made in 
those jurisdictions [utilizing similar "list of 
factors" tests to fix punitive awards] are no more 
fathomable than ours. The problem that results 
from this lack of guidance to juries . . . is 
exemplified by disparate ratios of punitive to 
actual damages . . .." Id. 
- "[T]he standard by which the jury is to gauge the 
amount of punitive damages, if any, that it is to 
award is incomprehensibly vague and unintelligible 
. . . . Under such a Nstandard, ' one jury can award 
$21,130.86 and another $2,490,000 for the same 
xwrong.'" Id. at 809 (quoting Charter Hospital of 
Mobile, Inc. v. Weinberg, 558 So.2d 909, 916-17 
(Ala. 1990). 
"Many states have recognized the problems created 
by giving finders of fact essentially standardless 
discretion to award punitive damages . . .." Id. 
The above-noted deficiencies which were inherent in the 
standards for assessing punitive damages in the State of Utah 
before Crookston compelled this court to "craft" a new set of 
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guidelines for awarding punitive damages. Id. at 808. In adopting 
such guidelines, the court adopted a "middle ground11 approach, 
rather than continuing to rely solely on the traditional "list-of-
factors standard" used in 1987 when the Crookston jury rendered its 
verdict. Id. at 809. 
B. The Crookston "Reasonable and Rational" Relationship 
Requirement. 
The new standard mandated by this Court's opinion in Crookston 
places additional emphasis or clarification on the requirement that 
there be a "reasonable and rational" relationship between a 
punitive damage award and the actual compensatory damages awarded 
by a jury. Id. at 810-11. This Court in Crookston further 
articulates the following general standard to enable juries, trial 
courts, and appellate courts to know what is mandated under the 
"reasonable and rational relationship" requirement: 
Generally, we have found punitive damage 
awards below $100,000 not to be excessive only 
when the punitives do not exceed actual 
damages by more than a ratio of approximately 
3-to-l. (Citations omitted) 
Because of the limited number of cases 
considering large awards, it is more difficult 
to note a particular pattern once the award 
exceeds approximately $100,000. However, it 
is safe to say that these large awards appear 
to receive more scrutiny than the smaller 
awards and that the acceptable ratio appears 
lower. (Citations omitted) 
The general rule to be drawn from our past 
cases appears to be that where the punitives 
are well below $100,000, punitive damage 
awards beyond a 3-to-l ratio to actual damages 
have seldom been upheld and that where the 
award is in excess of $100,000, we have 
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indicated some inclination to overturn awards 
having ratios of less than 3-to-l. 
Id. at 810 (emphasis added) 
C. Justice Requires That A New Jury Fix The Punitive Award 
With The Crookston Standards. 
This Court in Crookston did not clearly state what type of 
procedure the parties were entitled to in order to facilitate 
"further consideration11 of the punitive damage award in this case. 
Defendant requested that the trial court permit defendant to retry 
the issue of punitive damages to a new jury utilizing the Crookston 
standards. While the Federal or State Constitution do not 
apparently require the retroactive application of the Crookston 
opinion, notions of fair play and justice suggest strongly that a 
new jury should have been permitted to pass on the issue of 
punitive damages utilizing the Crookston standards. Even though 
courts are afforded discretion in determining whether to apply 
overruling decisions retroactively to pending actions, Loyal Order 
of Moose No. 2 59 v. County Board, 657 P.2d 257 (Utah 1982), this 
Court has also acknowledged that "ordinarily an overruling decision 
has retroactive operation." id. at 264. 
This Court is once again confronted with a challenge to an 
excessive punitive damage award rendered by a jury utilizing 
"essentially standardless discretion." On remand, Judge Frederick 
attempted to utilize the standards contained in the Crookston 
opinion to review an "essentially standardless" punitive award. 
Such a procedure which allowed the original trier of fact to use 
one formula, albeit of dubious assistance and guidance, to render 
10 
a $4.0 million punitive award, and then permitted Judge Frederick 
to use a new standard to review and pass upon the appropriateness 
of the initial award is fundamentally flawed. Such a procedure 
effectively infringes upon the rights to procedural fairness, due 
process, and trial by jury. The only procedure which would protect 
the interests of justice and fair play would be for a new jury to 
pass on the issue of punitive damages utilizing the Crookston 
standards.3 
POINT II, 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN REFUSING TO 
REMIT THE $4.0 MILLION PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARD 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STANDARDS SET FORTH IN 
CROOKSTON, 
This Court in Crookston outlined the standards by which 
punitive awards should be reviewed by trial and appellate courts to 
ensure due process and fairness for all parties involved. The 
reviewing court is to first determine whether punitive damages "are 
appropriate at all." Jd. at 808. This Court has already found 
that the requisite mental state for an award of punitive damages 
was properly decided by the jury. X£. The second inquiry in the 
post-verdict review is "whether the amount of punitives is 
excessive." Id. In determining the issue of excessiveness, a 
reviewing court is required to determine whether the award is 
excessive in light of the traditional "list of factors" standards: 
[T]he amount of the actual damages awarded, the 
nature of the wrongdoer's acts, the facts and 
On remand, defendant submitted to the trial court proposed jury instructions which incorporated the new standard set forth in Crookston. (R. 
3189-90) 
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circumstances surrounding the wrongful acts, the 
relative wealth of the wrongdoer, the probability 
the wrongdoer might act in the same way in the 
future, the relationship between the parties, and 
the effect of the misconduct on the lives of the 
victims and others. 
Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 771 (Utah 1985). In reviewing 
the excessiveness of a punitive award, this Court in Crookston 
further required that the punitive damages bear a "rational and 
reasonable" relationship to the compensatory damages awarded. In 
so doing, the Court set certain presumptive ratios. Crookston, 817 
P. 2d at 808. Analysis and application of the "list of factors" and 
the Crookston presumptive ratios to the present case demonstrate 
the excessive nature of the punitive damage award in this case. 
1. Amount of Actual Damages Awarded. 
At trial plaintiffs introduced evidence that they had 
sustained $323,399 in "hard" damages.4 The remaining $492,427 of 
the compensatory award apparently was based on the plaintiffs' 
emotional distress and loss of financial reputation. Such damages 
are characterized as "soft" damages. In Crookston, this court 
noted that one of the factors that may justify a remittitur is "the 
fact that a substantial portion of the actual damages is "soft," 
thus making the ratio analysis suspect. Id., at 811. In this case, 
plaintiffs7 damages, including prejudgment interest, were roughly 
60% "soft" and 40% "hard". Defendant does not dispute that those 
"soft" damages were "real." The critical issue is whether such 
It is important to also note that the "hard" damages awarded to plaintiffs by the jury were based upon the computations of Dr. Paul Randle. 
Dr. Randle inflated the "hard" damages at the time of trial by including 10% prejudgment interest in his calculations. As a result, the actual "hard" damages 
sustained by the plaintiffs were considerably less than the $323,399 testified to by Dr. Randle. 
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"soft" damages should be taken into account in applying the 
Crookston ratio standards. While general damages, such as for pain 
and suffering, are "real," they are considered "soft" because there 
is no ascertainable, tangible barometer or measurement by which 
they can be fixed with any mathematical basis or accuracy. On the 
other hand, "hard" damages, i.e., actual out-of-pocket damages, can 
be ascertained with mathematical precision, as Dr. Randle did in 
this case, opining that the "hard" damages consisted of exactly 
$323,399. 
Since more than 60% of the jury's compensatory damage award in 
this case consists of "soft" damages, it would be unfair and 
improper for this Court to apply the Crookston ratio standard to 
the entire compensatory award of $815,826. As the case currently 
stands, the $4.0 million punitive award bears more than a 4.9 to 1 
relationship to the compensatory damage award. However, if only 
"soft" damages are considered in applying the Crookston ratio, the 
punitive award bears an approximately 12.4 to 1 ratio to the "soft" 
damages. Under either view, the punitive damage award grossly 
exceeds the ratios suggested by Crookston. 
While this Court in Crookston suggested strongly that the 
trial court should take into account the distinction between "hard" 
and "soft" damages when determining the appropriate amount of 
punitive damages, the trial court refused to make such a 
distinction. id. at 811, n. 29. It is interesting to note the 
lengths to which the trial court went to try to make the 
plaintiffs7 damages fall within the Crookston presumptive ratio 
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standards. In the Memorandum Decision of February 10, 1992, the 
trial court characterized its additional judgment of $175,000 in 
attorney's fees, $151,330 in unawarded fees, and $11,126 in 
litigation expenses and costs as "actual damages". (R. 3214) The 
trial court then found the amount of actual damages to be 
$1,153,282. (R. 3214) The trial court then must have taken some 
consolation that its calculations now resulted in a punitive damage 
award falling within the presumptive ratio, stating, "when compared 
to the punitive damage sum awarded of $4,000,000, the ratio is 
approximately 2.88 to 1." (R. 3214) However, the trial court's 
mathematics were in error. Even assuming actual damages of 
$1,153,282, the ratio of punitive damages to the trial court's view 
of "actual damages" still resulted in a ratio of approximately 3.47 
to 1. Thus, not even the trial court could find a way to inflate 
the damages in this case to fall within the presumptive ratio 
standard. 
In determining the excessiveness of the punitive damages in 
this case, this Court should also take into account the sheer size 
of the extremely large award of "soft" damages, totaling nearly 
one-half million dollars in this case. In Cruz v. Montoya, 660 
P.2d 723 (Utah 1983), this Court remitted an award of punitive 
damages in part because "the jury was generous in its award of 
general damages." Id. at 727. In Cruz, the plaintiff was beaten 
in a physical altercation with the defendant. The jury awarded 
$9,000 in general damages, $579.89 in special damages, and $12,000 
in punitive damages. Although the court found that $9,000 in 
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general damages was not excessive, the court felt that the jury's 
generosity in awarding general damages necessitated a 50% reduction 
in the award of punitive damages. Id. 
The unprecedented award of $4.0 million in punitive damages 
when considered alongside the significant award of compensatory 
damages demand a remittitur of the punitive damage award in this 
case. In Wilson v. Oldrovd, 1 Utah 62, 267 P.2d 759 (1954), this 
Court in reducing an award of punitive damages in a case involving 
"a very substantial judgment for compensatory damages," recognized 
the unique position that this Court must play in reviewing punitive 
damage awards: 
Punitive damages are awarded on the theory 
that it is permissible in case of certain 
aggravated wrongs to permit the private 
litigant, in the public interest, to impose a 
penalty upon the defendant as a punishment and 
to deter others from engaging in similar 
offenses. The reasons why the jury and the 
trial judge are particularly advantaged to fix 
compensatory damages are much less cogent 
here. For this reason we feel more at liberty 
to review and modify the award as to punitive 
damages. 
Wilson, 267 P.2d at 766 (emphasis added). 
If left unremitted, the jury's punitive damage award in this 
case would not only grossly exceed the Crookston ratio standard, 
but would also amount to a penalty of nearly two and one-half 
months of defendant's net income in 1986. Such an award has been 
found in other jurisdictions to be clearly excessive. See Egan v. 
.Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal.3d 809, 169 Cal.Rptr. 691, 620 
P. 2d 141, (1979) (Award of $5.0 million in punitive damages against 
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insurer was excessive as a matter of law where it represented two 
and one-half months of insurer's entire net income in one year)• 
2. The Nature of the Wrongdoer's Acts, 
This Court has affirmed the jury's finding that defendant 
committed fraud upon plaintiffs. Crookston, 817 P.2d at 800. In 
reviewing the published cases involving punitive awards in cases of 
fraud, defendant has been unable to locate a Utah case where a jury 
has rendered a punitive damage award even approaching $4.0 million. 
While defendant acknowledges the jury's verdict against defendant 
has been affirmed by this Court, the record still does not contain 
any direct evidence that defendant's employees acted out of vindic-
tiveness or ill will towards plaintiffs. In fact, the direct 
evidence was to the contrary. (R. 1952-53, 2295) 
There were many extenuating circumstances in this case, the 
uniqueness of the loss itself, the inability of the parties to 
promptly obtain bids on the loss, and the repeated and insistent 
demands by the bank for payment under the policy. While such 
factors do not excuse defendant's conduct, such factors explain why 
this claim went awry. Plaintiffs were successful in convincing the 
jury that they had sustained real and significant injuries as a 
result of defendant's conduct. Plaintiffs were likewise successful 
in maintaining that the conduct of defendant was not only 
antisocial but outrageous. However, it can scarcely be said that 
the facts of this case are significantly worse than any other 
reported case in the State of Utah. Even a casual review of the 
case law of this state discloses equally deplorable conduct being 
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punished and deterred by much less severe awards of punitive 
damages. 
In Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985), a $500,000 
punitive damage award was affirmed against an individual who was 
found liable for defrauding an 82-year old man out of his ranch. 
The plaintiff had spent nearly 40 years building up his ranch at 
the time of the defendant's fraudulent acts- The defendant 
fraudulently obtained the ranch for approximately 10% of its 
conservatively assessed valuation of more than one million dollars 
by ingratiating himself with plaintiff, and by making false 
statements which led plaintiff to believe that the defendant was 
going to "save" plaintiff's ranch from a foreclosure sale. Von 
Hake represents the highest punitive damage award affirmed by this 
Court. 
While defendant's conduct has been found to have been wrong-
ful, the facts of this case do not warrant a punitive damage award 
of $4.0 million, eight times the size of the next highest award 
affirmed on appeal in Von Hake. 
3. Facts and Circumstances Surrounding Defendant's Miscon-
duct. 
This case arises from a situation where defendant owed duties 
to both plaintiffs and Rocky Mountain State Bank for the adjustment 
of the loss. The circumstances surrounding this loss were highly 
unique. The potential for delay, mistake, and errors of judgment 
were significant. While plaintiff maintained that defendant's 
employees acted with ill will, malice and total indifference toward 
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the Crookstons, the finding of malice upon which the jury based its 
punitive damage award was based upon circumstantial evidence. No 
witness at the trial testified that defendant's employees had 
actual malice towards plaintiffs. Where there is only circum-
stantial evidence of malice, a large and unprecedent award of 
punitive damages is unsupportable. In First Security Bank of Utah 
v. J.B.J. Feedvards, Inc. , 653 P.2d 791 (Utah 1982), this Court 
noted that an award of $100,000 was unsupportable where there was 
no direct evidence of the defendant's actual malice: 
In this case, the finding of actual malice on which 
the lower court based its punitive damages award 
was not derived from direct evidence concerning the 
state of mind of plaintiff's officers, but rather 
was inferred from plaintiff's wrongful actions. 
Such evidence, while sufficient to sustain the 
finding of the trial court, does not show a vindic-
tiveness or ill will so extreme as to warrant the 
vast sum awarded here, which is many times greater 
than the punitive damages awards in any of the 
cases cited by intervenor. The trial court's award 
of $100,000, considered in light of the actual harm 
suffered by the intervenor, the degree of malice 
shown by plaintiff and the other factors listed 
above, appears to this Court so excessive as to 
indicate that it was "arrived at by passion or 
prejudice" in violation of the above-quoted 
standards. Under these circumstances, this Court 
must reduce the award to an amount which the 
evidence, viewed most favorably to intervenor, can 
justify. We direct the trial court to modify its 
judgment to provide for punitive damages award of 
$50,000. 
Id. at 599 (emphasis added). 
4. Defendant's Relative Wealth. 
In determining whether the size of the punitive damage award 
in this case itself suggests a jury verdict motivated by passion 
and prejudice, this Court should pay particular attention to the 
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effect of having defendant's wealth injected into the case before 
liability had even been determined. Such a procedure is no longer 
permitted under Utah law. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1(2) (Supp. 
1992). The likelihood that evidence of a party's significant 
wealth might create undue prejudice and lead to excessive verdicts 
has been recognized by many courts. In City of Newport v. Fact 
Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 270-71 (1981), the United States 
Supreme Court noted: 
Because evidence of a tort-feasor's wealth is 
traditionally admissible as a measure of the amount 
of punitive damages that should be awarded, the 
unlimited taxing power of a municipality may have a 
prejudicial impact on the jury, in effect 
encouraging it to impose a sizable award. The 
impact of such a windfall recovery is likely to be 
both unpredictable and, at times, substantial 
The prejudicial impact of allowing evidence of an insurance 
company's wealth to go to the jury before liability for 
compensatory damages is determined is likewise apparent. One 
commentator has stated: 
It is probable that this very evidence, instead of 
aiding the jury to assess a proper verdict, may 
prejudice them against the defendant and prevent an 
impartial judgment, not only on the size of the 
verdict, but in deciding who shall win the case. 
It is a good guess that rich men do not fare well 
before juries, and the more emphasis played on 
their riches the less well they fare. 
Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1173, 1191 
(1931). See also, Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming 
Punitive Damages, 69 Va. L. Rev., 269, 285, 291 (1983). 
19 
It has long been established that justice should not depend 
upon a party's wealth or status. The introduction of evidence of 
defendant's wealth created a significant likelihood that an 
unprecedented award of punitive damages would be rendered in this 
case. The real potential for the jury to have misused evidence of 
defendant's wealth is further justification for this Court to remit 
the punitive award in this case. 
Plaintiffs also successfully argued in the court below that 
public policy considerations of punishment and deterrence would 
only be served by an outright reaffirmation of the jury's $4.0 
million punitive damage award. While defendant accepts this 
Court's pronouncement that an award of punitive damages is 
appropriate in this case, defendant respectfully submits that an 
award of $4.0 million is not required to effect the public policy 
concerns of deterrence and punishment. Plaintiffs' allegation that 
defendant has not yet been punished for its conduct ignores the 
reality of what has transpired since the day plaintiffs' home 
collapsed in 1982. Plaintiffs' own expert, Dr. Paul Randle, 
testified that this case arose from an underpayment of approxi-
mately $21,612 on plaintiff's loss. (R. 2458) Defendant has 
already been required to pay $1,489,263.14 in damages, fees and 
costs to plaintiffs. This represents nearly seventy (70) times the 
amount of the underpayment. Such costs do not even include the 
internal and external costs and fees incurred by defendant during 
the pendency of this case and the two appeals. If there is a 
lesson to be learned by defendant in this case, it can scarcely be 
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argued that paying nearly $1.5 million in compensatory damages as 
a result of a $21,612 underpayment would not teach that lesson and 
serve as a effective deterrent and punishment to defendant. 
5. Probability of Future Reoccurrence of Misconduct. 
Plaintiffs have asserted below that there is a tremendous 
potential and incentive for defendant's employees to engage in 
repeated misconduct in the future unless defendant is severely 
punished in this case. Nevertheless, the record demonstrates that 
there was no evidence introduced at trial suggesting that defendant 
would more than likely conduct itself in the same way in the 
future. Plaintiffs further ignore that the insurance industry is 
highly competitive and that competitiveness in the marketplace 
depends on the efficiency and thoroughness of service, not on 
insurance company mottos or slogan. Defendant would surely lose 
its ability to compete in the marketplace if its employees 
continued to engage in systematic fraud and bad faith, as suggested 
by plaintiff to the trial court. Such speculative and baseless 
assertions tend only to engender passion and prejudice and invite 
this court to abandon common sense and reason. 
The probability of future reoccurrence of misconduct is 
further lessened by the uniqueness of the circumstances surrounding 
this case. Plaintiff's home was an earth home of unusual 
construction. The collapse and ensuing damage to plaintiffs' earth 
home were not ordinary events with which defendant or any other 
entity or individual, including plaintiffs, were familiar. 
Plaintiffs' loss was one of a kind. No one quite knew how to 
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handle the loss, not out of spite or ill will for plaintiffs, but 
due to the uniqueness of the loss. Due to the unique nature of 
plaintiffs' loss, many qualified contractors refused to even 
consider making a bid on the repair of plaintiffs' home. (R. 
1687-88, 1976-77, 2035, 2557) 
In the court below, plaintiffs maintained that defendant's 
alleged failure to admit wrongdoing or to punish the employees who 
handled plaintiffs' claim are evidence of a cold, calculated and 
callous attitude likely to result in future misconduct. Plaintiffs 
urge that defendant's failure to demonstrate a penitent attitude 
suggests the likelihood that defendant will continue engaging in 
alleged wrongdoings on other unsuspecting policyholders in the 
future. The demand that defendant destroy the careers of its 
employees and interrupt the lives of their family members due to 
alleged mistakes made in the handling of a single claim is 
unwarranted and mean spirited. The uniqueness of the circumstances 
presented in this case demonstrate a low probability that defendant 
will engage in similar conduct in the future. Under such 
circumstances, a remittitur is warranted. See Bundv v. Century 
Equipment Co.. 692 P.2d 754, 759 (Utah 1984). 
6. Relationship Between the Parties, 
In Holland v. Moreton, 10 Utah 2d 390, 353 P.2d 789, 795 
(1960), this Court stated: 
Where there is a wrong involving the violation of a 
duty springing from a relation of trust or 
confidence, and the wrong is of a gross and 
aggravated nature, the malicious conduct necessary 
to justify punitive damages may be found. 
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In this case, the controversy between plaintiffs and defendant 
arose in the context of a first-party insurance contract. This 
Court has recognized that no relationship of trust or reliance is 
created by an insurance contract. Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 
701 P.2d 795, 800 (Utah 1985). Furthermore, practically speaking, 
an insurer and its insured are adversaries. Lyon v. Hartford 
Accid. & Indemn. Co. , 25 Utah 2d 311, 480 P.2d 739, 745 (1971), 
overruled on other grounds, 701 P.2d 795, 798 (1985). Since there 
were no breaches of fiduciary duties in this case, the staggering 
award of punitive damages is further unsupportable. 
7. Effect of the Misconduct on the Lives of the Victims and 
Others. 
In denying defendant's Motion for New or Remittitur, the trial 
court has found that defendant's wrongdoing "had devastating 
effects upon the Crookstons and to a lesser degree, many other 
innocent parties.11 (R. 3239) Defendant does not dispute that the 
jury found that the Crookstons were harmed by defendant's conduct. 
While a significant amount of evidence was adduced at trial 
establishing the emotional difficulties suffered by the plaintiffs 
following the settlement between defendant and Rocky Mountain State 
Bank, the quality of the evidence introduced to the jury concerning 
plaintiffs' emotional distress does not support the unprecedented 
award of punitive damages here. 
This Court has already suggested that the verdict on the 
compensatory award was "admittedly liberal." Crookston, 817 P.2d 
at 807, n. 22. The record establishes that plaintiffs were upset 
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and distraught over defendant's conduct. Nevertheless, there was 
not a single scintilla of medical testimony to support or 
substantiate the nature or extent of their emotional distress. The 
frustrations, aggravations, and traumas sustained by plaintiffs 
were unfortunate and serious. Plaintiffs' emotional difficulties 
have been fully compensated for by an admittedly "liberal11 
compensatory award. It should not be forgotten that the plain-
tiffs' emotional state was in part due to the mere fact that their 
"dream home" had collapsed. (R. 2209-10) As Mr. Crookston 
testified at trial, the collapse of the home was the most signifi-
cant emotional trauma ever sustained by him or his family. (Id.) 
The evidence of plaintiffs' emotional distress, however, was 
qualitatively deficient to support a punitive damage award eight 
times the next highest reported punitive damage award in this 
state.5 
POINT III, 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY CONSIDERING 
PACTS AND INFERENCES NOT SUPPORTED IN THE 
TRIAL RECORD. 
On remand, ti e trial court permitted the parties to submit 
memoranda and oral argument on defendant's Motion for New Trial or 
Remittitur. Plaintiffs' memorandum in opposition contained 
numerous facts and inferences which were not properly before the 
trial court, including assertions that since the time of trial the 
This Court should also contrast the punitive damage award and plaintiffs' emotional distress in this case with the facts in Elkington v. Foust, 
618 P.2d 37 (Utah 1980) (Court affirmed a punitive damage award of $30,000 where there was expert medical testimony of permanent psychological damage 
resulting from seven years of prolonged sexual assault and abuse, including sexual intercourse, between a minor and her step-father). 
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plaintiffs had remained homeless, that plaintiffs had been unable 
to obtain credit, that plaintiffs' creditors had never been paid, 
and that defendant had never admitted wrongdoing or "voluntarily 
take any action to rectify the wrongs" or "reprimand the 
perpetrators." (R. 3125-3126) Plaintiffs' counsel also attempted 
to engender passion and prejudice in the trial judge by attempting 
to inject the wealth of other members of the Farmers Insurance 
Group of Companies into the proceedings, (R. 3273-74) Judge 
Frederick in his Memorandum Decision of February 10, 1992, 
incorporated many of those same facts and inferences into his 
ruling. (R. 3197-2219) 
It is patently unfair for a trial court, charged with the duty 
to review the sufficiency of the evidence presented to a jury, to 
entertain and adopt facts and inferences never presented to the 
jury in the first instance. Defendant respectfully submits that 
the trial court's consideration and adoption of such prejudicial 
factors outside the trial record were improper and unduly tainted 
the trial court's ruling in this case. 
The trial court's Order denying defendant's Motion for New 
Trial or Remittitur is further deficient to the extent that it 
contains findings of fact and conclusions of law which were not 
supported in the trial record by competent testimony. Paragraph 3 
of the trial court's Order contains the following language not 
supported in the record: 
The wrongdoing of this case was motivated by 
financial gain. When dealing with a multi-million 
dollar corporation which appears to have a 
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prevailing philosophy that justifies unscrupulous 
behavior for financial gain, a significant punitive 
award is required . • .. 
(R. 3240) 
Likewise, paragraph 4 of the Order contains the following 
language not supported in the record: 
This court concludes that the most effective means 
of punishing and deterring the defendant in this 
case is through a significant punitive damage 
award. Insurance companies are generally regulated 
by the Insurance Department of the State of Utah. 
This case illustrates the lack of deterrent effect 
of the Insurance Department. 
Paragraph 6 of the Order also contains the following language 
not supported in the record: 
Defendant, by the very nature of its business, has 
the capacity and expertise to calculate in advance 
its exposure to liability and spread the cost 
thereof, thus diminishing the deterrent effect of 
punitive damages if limited by a ratio or ceiling. 
In this case the relative importance of the 
presumptive ratio should therefore be less. 
(R. 3241) 
The consideration of such facts and the conclusions of law 
drawn therefrom by the trial demonstrate the need for this matter 
to be either remanded for a new trial on the issue of punitive 
damages or for this Court to order an appropriate remittitur. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, defendant Fire Insurance Exchange 
respectfully requests that this Court vacate the trial court's 
denial of defendant's Motion for New Trial or Remittitur and remand 
the action back to the trial court for a new trial on the issue of 
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punitive damages or in the alternative that this Court remit the 
unprecedented award of $4.0 million in punitive damages against 
this defendant based upon the record presented to the jury. 
Dated this XL/"^day of July, 1992. 
STRONG & HANNI 
Philip R.' Fffchler 
Stephen J. Trayner 
Attormeys for Defendant-
Appellant 
103679bc 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Rule 59(a), U.R.C.P. 
2. Memorandum Decision, February 10, 1992 
3. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
Denying Defendant's Motion for New Trial or in 
the Alternative Remittitur, March 25, 1992 
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RULE 59(A), U.R.C.P. 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new 
trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or 
part of the issues, for any of the following causes; provided, 
however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried 
without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and 
conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct 
the entry of a new judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury 
or adverse party, or any order of the court, or abuse of 
discretion by which either party was prevented from having a 
fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more 
of the jurors have been induced to assent to any general or 
special verdict, or to a finding on any question submitted to 
them by the court, by resort to a determination by chance or 
as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the 
affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could 
not have guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party 
making the application, which he could not, with reasonable 
diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have 
been given under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict 
or other decision, or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION, FEBRUARY 10, 1992 
FEB 1 0 1S32 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
S. LARRY CROOKSTON, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. CR-83-1030 
Defendant Fire Insurance Exchange (hereinafter "Fire 
Insurance") has filed a Motion for New Trial or Remittitur, 
with supporting Memoranda; plaintiffs have responded by filing 
a Memorandum in opposition. These pleadings were filed after 
failed efforts to settle the controversy conducted by this 
Court on October 7, 1991. 
This matter was tried with a jury for six days, commencing 
on the 26th day of May, 1987. After denial of defendant Fire 
Insurance's initial Motion for New Trial or Remittitur, the 
Utah Supreme Court in the matter of Crookston v. Fire Insurance 
Exchange, 164 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (June 28, 1991), affirmed the 
jury verdict, but remanded the matter for further determination 
by this Court as to whether or not the punitive damage award 
O.'ttS? 
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was appropriate and/or excessive. After submission of 
respective Memoranda, counsel presented oral argument in 
support of their respective positions on January 31, 1992. 
This Court having now reviewed the Memoranda, the Supreme Court 
decision, the file materials, the transcript, its own notes of 
the trial, and heard oral argument, is prepared to rule. 
OPINION 
At trial, plaintiffs7 expert economist, Dr. Paul Randall, 
testified incident to the claim of economic damages sustained 
by the plaintiffs as a result of conduct alleged to have been 
inappropriate by the defendant Fire Insurance. He testified 
that those economic losses amounted to $323,399.00. The jury 
awarded the sum of $815,826.00 total compensatory damages. The 
Supreme Court has opined that the difference between the 
economic losses and the total amount of compensatory damages 
awarded, namely, $492,427.00 was "apparently attributable to 
emotional distress and loss of financial reputation." In 
addition, the jury awarded punitive damages in the amount of 
$4,000,000.00. This Court, subsequent to trial awarded 
$175,000.00 attorney's fees to plaintiffs, as well as their 
costs incurred of $11,126.00. Fire Insurance seeks, pursuant 
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to Rule 59(a)(5), a remittitur of the punitive damages of 
$4,000,000.00, or alternatively a new trial. 
A Motion for a New Trial as presented, on the issue of 
punitive damages requires of the trial court a two-prong 
inquiry^ (1) whether punitives are appropriate at all; and (2) 
whether the amount of punitives is excessive, appearing to have 
been given under influence of passion or prejudice. The 
responsibility of the trial court is to review the. amount of 
the award to insure that the jury has acted within proper 
bounds. This is so because the trial judge is present during 
all aspects of the trial and listens to and views all witnesses 
and is in an advantaged position to determine if the jury acted 
with passion or prejudice. To grant a new trial, the trial 
court must conclude that the jury erred, not merely because it 
disagrees with the jury's judgment. The trial court, if it is 
inclined to grant a new trial or remittitur, should indicate 
wherein there was plain disregard of the instructions of the 
Court or the evidence, or what constituted passion or prejudice. 
If the trial court reasonably concludes the jury acted with 
passion or prejudice contrary to Rule 59(a)(5) it may grant a 
new trial. 
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The award of compensatory damages in the amount of 
$323,339.00 for economic loss, and $492,427.00 for emotional 
and mental distress, and loss of financial reputation, for a 
total of $815,826.00, was upheld by the Supreme Court, as was 
the award of attorney's fees of $175,000.00, and expenses of 
$11,126.00. These sums this Court is advised were paid after 
the decision by the Utah Supreme Court. 
In this case, the jury clearly concluded as did this Court, 
that the requisite mental state required to support an award of 
punitive damages was present, which finding was affirmed by the 
Supreme Court. 
Punitive damages are designed to punish past and deter 
future, egregious conduct. Here, the award of $4,000,000.00 
according to the Supreme Court exceeds the bounds of the 
general pattern set by prior Supreme Court ' decisions. In 
deciding, therefore, whether the award is or is not excessive, 
notwithstanding the fact that it exceeds the pattern of awards 
previously upheld, seven factors are to be considered. These 
are the same seven factors considered by the jury (in 
Instruction No. 33) in arriving at its verdict. This Court 
will address each, in a somewhat different order, commencing 
with the facts and circumstances surrounding Fire Insurance's 
misconduct. 
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I. FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING FIRE 
INSURANCES MISCONDUCT 
The most flagrant conduct of Fire Insurance centered around 
intentional fraud of its agents. By April 15, 1982, Fire 
Insurance, for the loss plaintiffs7 sustained in December of 
1981, had obtained bids from two contractors: one for 
$50,951.00; the other for $49,600.00; and had extended 
authority to settle the claim for $49,443.00. In ,May, 1982, 
the adjuster obtained another bid for $74,000.00. Immediately 
thereafter, Fire Insurance replaced its initial adjuster, 
Denton Mosier, with one "more experienced," Alan Clapperton. 
Alan Clapperton, while in possession of the three bids ranging 
from $49,600.00 to $74,000.00, and armed with authority to 
settle for $49,443.00, nevertheless, sought and obtained a 
fictitious bid based only on a portion of the loss, for 
$27,830.60, which was just slightly more than one-half of the 
other bids received. The evidence was undisputed that the bid 
did not account for several items comprising the plaintiffs7 
loss, and was based upon an engineering report which was not 
intended to be the basis of a bid. Clapperton knew the bid was 
insufficient; he knew the Crookstons would object to the bid; 
and moreover, he knew that the bank (loss payee) with whom he 
had arranged to meet to negotiate settlement, would not settle 
for such amount if the other bids were disclosed. 
03201 
CROOKSTON V. FIRE INSURANCE PAGE 6 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
In order to accomplish his scheme, Clapperton simply told 
Ralph Klemm, counsel for the plaintiffs, on the very day he was 
scheduled to meet with the bank, that he had no authority to 
settle; concealed the existence of the fictitious bid; and 
without disclosing his intent to Klemm, surreptitiously 
conducted his negotiations with the bank. While meeting with 
the bank, Clapperton did not disclose the fact that three other 
bids, all substantially higher, had been obtained, nor did he 
reveal that the fictitious bid of $27,830.60 was based on an 
engineer's appraisal limited to structural damage only. The 
bank officer agreed to settle for slightly more than 
$32,000.00, the amount of the "bid", plus an approximation of 
the interest that had accrued on the Crookston loan since the 
collapse. Knowing full well that the $27,830.60 bid was 
substantially lower than any other bid, Clapperton insisted 
that the bank accept a settlement check made out only to the 
bank, not jointly to the bank and the Crookstons, and that the 
bank execute a proof of loss form releasing Fire Insurance from 
any further liability on the claim. The settlement was 
effected that same day. The intentional fraud was completed 
when Clapperton advised Klemm, when he discovered what had 
transpired, that the Crookstons did not have to be included in 
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the settlement, that nothing more was owing, and that he was 
closing his file. 
Clapperton admitted at trial that he knew that the bank 
would pursue the Crookstons for a deficiency claim on the 
$60,000.00 construction loan not paid by the insurance 
settlement. Clapperton purposely sought an incomplete and 
unrealistic bid from an insider, Phipps; concealed the bid from 
the Crookstons, lied to their attorney about the status of the 
claim on the very day he negotiated with the bank; did not 
disclose that he had any settlement authority; and deliberately 
excluded the Crookstons from negotiations with the bank. 
Because the Crookstons lacked the means to pay off the loan, 
the bank threatened foreclosure. In order to avoid additional 
interest, attorney's fees and costs, the Crookstons deeded the 
property on which the home stood, to the bank in lieu of 
foreclosure, and then filed bankruptcy. 
Clapperton left the Crookstons vulnerable to foreclosure 
and bankruptcy knowing that would be the likely consequence of 
his actions. 
Clapperton's supervisor, Kent Soderquist, had previous 
experience as a loan officer for a bank and was aware of the 
bank's foreclosure rights under its Deed of Trust. Both 
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Soderquist and Clapperton were well aware that if insurance 
proceeds were not timely and adequately paid, the bank would 
foreclose. Furthermore, Fire Insurance through its agents had 
actual knowledge that the bank was proceeding or intended to 
proceed to foreclose on Crookstons' property. The most graphic 
evidence of Fire Insurance's intent evidencing total 
indifference to the Crookstons' plight, can be seen from the 
language of the letter, a trial exhibit, from Clapperton to 
Frank Roybal, counsel for Fire Insurance, dated July 27, 1982, 
at page 3, wherein Clapperton states as follows: 
The bank has indicated that they intended to 
proceed with foreclosure on the lot in order 
to recoup the $18,000.00 they were still out 
on the construction loan.... At this point, 
we feel Farmers Insurance Group would have a 
subrogation right against several of the 
parties involved. 
All of Fire Insurance7s representatives acknowledged at 
trial that the purpose of insurance was to prevent extreme 
financial hardship and loss of property that would otherwise 
occur, but for insurance. Fire Insurance ratified and approved 
all of the actions taken by its agents. The regional office of 
Fire Insurance and the district branch claims manager reviewed 
the claims file routinely during all relevant times, and had 
made various communications to the adjusters. 
After the Crookstons filed a complaint with the Utah State 
Insurance Department, the regional office denied any 
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responsibility to the Crookstons. Incredibly the agents of 
Fire Insurance testified at trial that the practices which had 
been employed in this case were sound business practices. 
Three of Fire Insurance's employees who testified at trial 
stated that they believed they had treated the Crookstons 
fairly. The claims adjuster who committed the fraud, 
Clapperton, stated without any indication of remorse or regret, 
that he "felt good" about what he did to the Crookstons. 
Apparently, based upon his record of improving profits for Fire 
Insurance, he was twice promoted since his dealings with the 
Crookstons. He is now the District Claims Manager supervising 
the adjustment of all claims in northern Utah. 
II. THE RELATIVE WEALTH OF THE DEFENDANT 
At trial, evidence established that Fire insurance's total 
assets in 1986, the year immediately prior to the date of the 
trial, were $723,468,116.00; its total underwriting, investment 
and other income for 1986 was $595,284,582.00; and its net 
income for that one year was $2 3,000,000.00. At the time of 
the trial, the evidence disclosed that there were four claims 
offices in Utah, each handling 4,000 to 5,000 claims per year. 
In addition, scores of other offices located in the western 
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United States handle a similar number of claims. Fire 
Insurance is only one of approximately five insurance companies 
doing business as Farmers Insurance Group. Four of the five 
Farmers companies use the same claims offices, management, and 
presumably the same claims adjustment techniques as that of 
Fire insurance. When compared to the total assets of Fire 
Insurance only, for 1986, the punitive damage award amounts to 
approximately one-half of one percent. It goes without saying 
that there is no rational comparison between Fire Insurance's 
assets and income to that of plaintiffs: they were bankrupt. 
III. NATURE OF THE ALLEGED MISCONDUCT 
Milton Beck, an insurance adjuster with 22 years of 
experience, and Dr. Paul Randall, a professor of finance, who 
teaches property and casualty insurance at Utah State 
University, persuasively described the actions of Fire 
Insurance as "blatantly outrageous" and "totally unacceptable", 
outlining the following wrongful actions: 
(a) Excluding the Crookstons from settlement negotiations; 
(b) Relying on a bid which was almost one-half of other 
bids. Such a discrepancy would mean there was something 
wrong with the low bid; 
Q?2Q5 
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(c) Failing to disclose all other bids to the bank; 
(d) Improperly requiring the bank to sign a satisfaction 
of claim and release without rebuilding the home; 
(e) Requiring the bank to sign a release and refusing to 
deal with the Crookstons thereafter, leaving the Crookstons 
personally exposed to further proceedings by the bank; 
(f) Representing that the Phipps bid ($27,830.60) was 
adequate, and all that was owing under the policy, when 
there were clearly other coverages and amounts owing 
thereunder; 
(g) Refusing to include the insureds7 name on a settlement 
check in payment of a substantial amount of money; 
(h) Representing that engineer Rich's report (on which the 
Phipps "bid" was obtained) was a complete analysis of the 
damage when it was not; 
(i) Using the Crookstons7 failure to sign a proof of loss 
form as grounds for denying their claims, particularly when 
the Crookstons were not provided with such a form, and 
adequate evidence of the loss had been provided to Fire 
Insurance; 
(j) Rejecting the bids of Brewster, Stallings and Jones 
(the three legitimate bids) because of insufficient detail, 
without requesting the additional information and detail; 
0o?rsr» 
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(k) Failing to disclose to the Crookstons that Fire 
Insurance was rejecting the other bids and the reasons 
therefore; 
(1) Not communicating with the Crookstons during the 
entire adjusting process; 
(m) Refusing to consider additional claims of the 
Crookstons after settling with the bank, denying 
responsibility to the insurance commissioner when a 
complaint was filed by the Crookstons, and forcing the 
Crookstons to bring legal action; 
(n) Refusing to clean up the collapse, even after the city 
had given notice and threatened to condemn the property due 
to the hazardous situation; 
(o) Delaying over six months while the Crookston home was 
unfit for occupation, before making any attempts to settle; 
(p) Maintaining a company policy that the only duty of an 
adjuster is to protect the financial interests of the 
insurance company and not the insured. 
The evidence supporting Fire Insurance's position with 
regard to the adjustment of the Crookstons' claim and Fire 
Insurance's apparent satisfaction with the manner in which its 
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own insureds were treated represents both to this Court and 
apparently to the jury, that ill-will, malice and/or total 
indifference to the Crookstons was its attitude. Having sought 
an inadequate bid, and having excluded the Crookstons from the 
negotiations, Fire Insurance was in total control of the 
settlement with the bank. Knowing that the settlement would 
have a devastating impact on the Crookstons, Clapperton 
nevertheless proceeded in a fraudulent, malicious fashion with 
one goal in mind: to cheat the plaintiffs out of their just 
due and thereby presumably improve his standing with his 
employer. By their actions, the agents and representatives of 
Fire Insurance demonstrated either actual malice and ill-will 
toward the Crookstons and intended the consequence of their 
actions, or Fire Insurance's agents acted wrongfully, solely to 
further their own financial well-being, despite actual 
knowledge of devastating harm to the Crookstons. 
IV. THE EFFECT OF DEFENDANTS MISCONDUCT ON THE LIVES 
OF THE PLAINTIFFS AND OTHERS 
The plaintiffs each testified at trial to the devastating 
effect the actions of Fire Insurance had on their personal 
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lives. They suffered serious emotional and nervous conditions, 
which were of long-standing nature, and the devastation 
testified to continued from the date of the loss, at least 
through the trial (approximately six years). In addition, the 
plaintiffs were forced to file bankruptcy and lost, as a 
result, all of their savings and the lot they had purchased 
upon which to build their "dream home." 
The loss to others involved the parents of the. plaintiffs 
who had loaned them some $12,000.00 for the construction of 
their home. They were not paid until after the Supreme Court 
decision in this matter, in June 1991, some ten years after the 
loss. in addition, none of the Crookston bankruptcy creditors 
were paid. The bank, after settling with Fire Insurance and 
being required to foreclose and repossess the Crookstons7 
property, nevertheless sustained a loss of approximately 
$5,000,00. Subcontractors who provided materials and labor to 
the Crookstons' home were forced to file liens and commence a 
suit against the Crookstons. The general contractor was never 
fully paid, and Fire Insurance failed to timely clean up the 
debris from the collapse of the home, forcing the city where 
the home was located to seek condemnation of the Crookstons' 
property because of the hazardous condition it created for 
neighborhood children. 
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V. THE PROBABILITY OF FUTURE RECURRENCE OF THE MISCONDUCT 
Fire Insurance has maintained a stance of denial of 
wrongdoing since the beginning of this case. All of the 
witnesses for Fire Insurance testified they believed they had 
treated the Crookstons fairly. Clapperton, moreover, testified 
that he felt good about what he did to the Crookstons. 
Clapperton has been twice promoted since the incident in 
question, and as indicated he is now District Claims Manager 
for Northern Utah. 
Denton Mosier, since his involvement in the matter, has 
been made supervisor and testified that the handling of the 
Crookstons7 claim was done according to company policy, was 
appropriate, and was handled in a fashion similar to the 
handling of other claims. 
Mr. Soderquist, Clapperton7s supervisor at the time of the 
loss, described the claims adjusting philosophy of not just 
Fire Insurance, but for all Farmers Insurance Group to indicate 
that the adjuster's sole responsibility is his duty to the 
insurance company: to protect the insurance company's 
interests. And any efforts to assist the insureds in proving 
their loss would be "beyond the scope of his actual duties as 
an adjuster." He testified the adjuster does not have a duty 
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to protect the interests of the insureds, and technically the 
adjuster is not required to be concerned about public 
relations. 
In addition, the evidence revealed that there are 
approximately four claims offices of Fire Insurance in Utah, 
each handling 4,000 to 5,000 claims per year, and scores of 
other such claims offices throughout the states which handle a 
similar number of claims. These claims offices adjust most, if 
not all, claims of all members of the Farmers Insurance Group. 
It is the view of this Court, that Fire Insurance's conduct 
and lack of remorse incident thereto demonstrate a calculated 
and calloused attitude toward the settlement of claims, and 
this is in accord with what agents of Fire Insurance perceive 
to be in keeping with their company policy. 
From Fire Insurance's point of view, it certainly can be 
argued that $4,000,000.00 punitive damages is excessive. 
However, from a public policy point of view, the award is 
justified. In the absence of punitive damages, Fire Insurance 
may well find that it is profitable to continue its illegal 
conduct, even though it may incur the cost of compensatory 
damages from time to time. One may never know how many of the 
thousands of claims handled in Utah and elsewhere by Fire 
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Insurance have been subjected to the same kind of fraudulent 
manipulation as occurred in this case, with devastating losses 
to those who contracted in good faith. A $4,000,000.00 
punitive damage award can certainly have a salubrious effect in 
inducing Fire Insurance to bring its practices into harmony 
with common moral conduct and accepted business ethics, to say 
nothing of the requirements of the law. 
VI. RELATIONSHIP OF THE PARTIES 
The loss payee provision in favor of the bank on the 
insurance policy with Fire Insurance created a relationship 
between the Crookstons and Fire Insurance of one in the nature 
of a fiduciary relationship. In a third party insurance 
situation, the insurer is a fiduciary of the insured. The 
insurer assumes responsibility for the insured and control over 
the claims of third parties against the insured. By contrast, 
in first party situations, the insurer and the insured are 
essentially adversaries, because their interests concerning 
payment under the policy are opposed. 
The instant matter is somewhere between a first and third 
party situation. The insurer by its loss payee responsibility 
assumed the position of standing in for and protecting the 
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interests of the Crookstons from claims of the bank, the loss 
payee. If Fire Insurance did not have a legal duty to protect 
the interests of the Crookstons, it at least had the 
responsibility to avoid doing harm to the Crookstons by 
surreptitiously settling with the bank for sums admittedly much 
less than the balance owing on the bank obligation; the policy 
limits; and well below the amount of the legitimate bids known 
to the defendant. 
VII. THE AMOUNT OF ACTUAL DAMAGES AWARDED 
The actual attorney's fees paid by the Crookstons were 
based upon a contingency fee of 40%. This Court, however, only 
awarded $175,000.00 in fees, which was a little more than half 
of the actual fees paid by the Crookstons. The fees and 
litigation expenses constituted an actual loss to the 
Crookstons. In determining the ratio, the Supreme Court used 
the words "actual damages." Since the attorney's fees and 
litigation expenses were an "actual" damage sustained by the 
Crookstons and were awarded by the Court, such figures should 
be included in determining the ratio. This is consistent with 
Canyon Country Store v. Bracev, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989), 
wherein the Supreme Court held that the actual contingent fee 
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was a consequential damage and should be awarded against the 
insurer who acted in bad faith, stating at 420: 
Canyon Country's claim for recovery of fees 
was predicated on the theory that attorney 
fees were an item of consequential damages 
flowing from the insurers' breach of 
contract. This is a legitimate theory of 
damages, as the trial court recognized. 
Had Canyon Country been decided before the Crookston trial, 
this Court would have awarded a 40% contingent fee .instead of 
$175,000.00 in "reasonable" fees actually awarded. The deficit 
of $151,3 30.00 as unawarded fees, constitutes additional 
"actual" loss to the Crookstons. 
The amount of actual damages incurred amounts to 
$1,153,282.00 ($815,826.00 compensatory, $175,000.00 and 
$151,330.00 attorney's fees, and $11,126.00 expenses and 
costs). When compared to the punitive damage sum awarded of 
$4,000,000.00, the ratio is approximately 2.88 to 1. There is 
nothing in the Crookston opinion that would suggest that the 
presumptive ratio is based on "hard" damages, rather than all 
"actual" damages. In fact, in the cases cited in Crookston 
where "soft" damages were awarded, the ratio cited by the court 
includes the "soft" damages. The Supreme Court suggests that 
if a substantial portion of the damages are "soft", the trial 
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court may consider that fact on a motion for remittitur. 
However, it is not a factor to determine the ratio. The Utah 
Supreme Court has never suggested that "soft" damages are not 
real or should not be compensated. 
Though the amount of so-called "soft" damages comprises 
approximately 60% of the total compensatory damage award, 
those damages were nevertheless real, and represented suffering 
and loss sustained by plaintiffs. The plaintiffs'. emotional 
distress was severe and of longstanding duration. The jury was 
instructed as to what properly constitutes emotional distress, 
pain and suffering. The Supreme Court has affirmed that 
determination by the jury as being well within their 
discretion. This Court's view is that the jury's finding was 
appropriate and supported by the evidence. 
As the Utah Supreme Court stated in the case of Price v. 
Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325 (1975), at 1329: 
The pain and suffering inflicted on the mind 
and the emotions by such wrongful act of 
another is no less real; and should be no 
less entitled to be compensated for. 
The problem is not that emotional harm should not be 
compensated, but how to insure that the damages awarded are 
commensurate with the emotional harm. In addressing the 
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problem, courts often consider whether there is physical harm 
associated with the mental harm. Courts also examine the 
conduct of the defendant to determine whether emotional harm 
will naturally and reasonably follow therefrom. Professor 
Prosser, in discussing this issue, stated: 
[W]here physical harm is lacking, the courts 
will properly tend to look for more in the 
way of extreme outrage as an assurance that 
the mental disturbance claimed is not 
fictitious; but that if the enormity of the 
outrage itself carries conviction that there 
has in fact been severe and serious 
emotional distress which is neither feigned, 
nor trivial, bodily harm is not required. 
Prosser, "Insult and Outrage," 44 Cal.Rev. 40 
(1956). 
The actions of Fire Insurance were extreme and outrageous. 
There is nothing fictitious or trivial about the Crookstons' 
bankruptcy and loss of their home and property. Given the 
egregious conduct and succeeding events, there is no doubt that 
the Crookstons' claims for mental distress are real, unfeigned, 
and far from trivial and therefore should be viewed as real 
damage. 
The amount of punitive damages awarded must bear some 
reasonable relationship to the actual compensatory damages 
incurred as the jury was instructed in Instruction No. 34. 
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Despite the fact that the ratio here involved is higher than 
has been generally approved by the Supreme Court in the past, 
here the defendant is a multi-million dollar corporation. 
Moreover, it is this Court7 s view that Fire Insurance has 
displayed an extremely high degree of malice, with actual 
intent to harm for the benefit of its own financial interests, 
or at the very least, a high degree of likelihood of great harm 
to the plaintiffs based upon the reprehensible nature of the 
acts involved. 
The calculation of the ratio is simply one of seven 
separate elements and to be given, in this Court's view, no 
greater or lesser weight than any of the other six elements. 
One must not simply, mechanically apply an arbitrary ratio, 
thereby allowing the ratio factor to subsume all of the other 
six factors to be considered. It is necessary and appropriate 
to send a clear and unmistakable message to Fire Insurance and 
others similarly situated that the type of egregious conduct 
involved which results in the devastating loss, both financial 
and emotional as here involved, will not be tolerated. This, 
the jury has done. There was no evidence at all at trial that 
the practices and procedures involved have in any manner been 
changed by Fire Insurance. There was no indication of 
0^217 
CROOKSTON V. FIRE INSURANCE PAGE 23 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
contrition or remorse and, in fact, it appeared that Fire 
Insurance was pleased with the outcome of the adjustment of the 
loss, and to this day has failed or refused to recognize the 
wrong that it has wrought upon the plaintiffs. If the facts 
of this case do not warrant deviation from the historically 
approved ratio of punitives to compensatory damages, it is 
difficult if not impossible for this Court to conceive of a 
fact situation wherein a deviation is warranted. 
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those delineated in 
the Memorandum of the plaintiffs in opposition to defendant's 
Motion for New Trial or Remittitur, this Court is not persuaded 
the jury acted under the influence of passion or prejudice, and 
the Motion of Fire Insurance is denied. Counsel for plaintiffs 
is directed to prepare the appropriate Order. 
Dated this AP^SLay of February, 1992. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
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FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
NEW TRIAL OR IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE REMITTITUR 
Civil No. C83-1030 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Defendant Fire Insurance Exchange's Motion for New^rial or in the Alternative 
Remittitur came regularly before the court on the 31st day of January, 1992, at the hour of 8:30 
a.m. The parties previously filed memoranda in support and in opposition to the motion. This 
court reviewed the memoranda, the Supreme Court opinion, the file materials, the transcript, 
its own notes of the trial and considered extensive oral argument by counsel. ThB court 
thereafter took the matter under advisement and issued a Memorandum Decision on February 
10, 1992, wherein the court articulated its findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting its 
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decision to deny defendant's motion. Said Memorandum Decision is fully incorporated herein 
by reference. 
This court reaffirms its denial of defendant's Motion for New Trial and Remittitur and 
reaffirms its conclusion that the punitive damage award should not be reduced. In so doing, the 
court expresses the following conclusions in conjunction with its more detailed analysis of its 
findings and conclusions contained in its Memorandum Decision. 
1. The primary purposes of punitive damages are to punish and deter serious wrongdoing 
which is destructive to the social fiber of our society. The severity of the punishment should 
coincide with the severity of the wrongdoing. Likewise, the greater the potential is that the 
wrongdoing is widespread and profitable, the greater the need is for deterrence. 
2. Regarding the purpose of punishment, the court has carefully analyzed the nature and 
extent of defendant's wrongdoing and the effect thereof. It is this court's view that Fire 
Insurance has displayed an extremely high degree of malice, with actual intent to harm for the 
benefit of its own financial interests, or at the very least, a high degree of likelihood of great 
harm to the plaintiffs. Defendant's actions were reprehensible and involved intentional fraud 
for financial gain. Defendant's wrongdoing had devastating effects upon the Crookstons and to 
a lesser degree, many other innocent parties. Defendant's wrongdoing was particularly 
aggravating and reprehensible due to the nature of its business, i.e. marketing, advertising and 
selling "peace of mind" and "hope" to those who had been devastated by catastrophic events. 
When an insurer is called upon to perform, its insureds are often victims of tragic events, 
leaving them financially and emotionally vulnerable. The potential adverse effect on the lives 
2 
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of family members, neighbors, employers and others is also great. Under these circumstances, i 
intentional fraud for profit is even more culpable. The severity of defendant's actions in this 
case requires a severe punishment and the punitive damage award of $4,000,000 is not overly 
severe. 
3. The second purpose of punitive damages, deterrence, is equally applicable in this 
case. Defendant's conduct and lack of remorse incident thereto, not just at the time of the I 
wrongful conduct but even thereafter throughout the litigation, demonstrate a calculated and 
calloused attitude toward the settlement of claims, and this was in accord with what agents of 
defendant perceived to be in keeping with their company policy. The wrongdoing in this case 
was motivated by financial gain. When dealing with a multi-million dollar corporation which 
appears to have a prevailing philosophy that justifies unscrupulous behavior for financial gain, I 
|| a significant punitive damage award is required to obtain the desired result of bringing 
!! I 
ii defendant's practices into harmony with common moral conduct, accepted business ethics and i 
i 
the requirements of the law. i 
i 4. This court concludes that the most effective means of punishing and deterring the l 
defendant in this case is through a significant punitive damage award. Insurance companies are 
generally regulated by the Insurance Department of the State of Utah. This case illustrates the 
lack of deterrent effect of the Insurance Department. After Crookstons filed a complaint with 
the Insurance Department, defendant's regional office denied any responsibility to the 
Crookstons. The Insurance Department then advised the Crookstons that it could do* nothing 
further and that Crookstons would need to seek a judicial remedy. As in this case, there is 
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nearly always a large disparity between the financial resources of an insurer and its insured, 
particularly after a catastrophic loss. The deterrent value of punitive damages is one of the very 
few equalizing tools an injured party has against a multimillion dollar corporation which engages 
in such wrongful practices. 
5. The ratio of compensatory damages to punitive damages in this case exceeds the 
presumptive ratio set by the Utah Supreme Court in the Crookston opinion. (On page 19 of the 
Memorandum Decision this court erred in computing the ratio in this case. The ratio should be 
3.47 to 1 instead of 2.88 to 1 and the Memorandum Decision is therefore amended accordingly.) 
For the reasons set forth above, a ratio greater than the presumptive ratio is justified. 
Defendant, by the very nature of its business, has the capacity and expertise to calculate in 
advance its exposure to liability and spread the cost thereof, thus diminishing the deterrent effect 
of punitive damages if limited by a ratio or ceiling. In this case the relative importance of the 
presumptive ratio should therefore be less. 
6. The collective analysis of the seven factors upon which a punitive damage award is 
based weighs heavily in favor of sustaining the $4,000,000 award. In fact, with the exception 
of the presumptive ratio, all of the seven factors support the award. If the facts of this case do 
not warrant deviation from the historically approved ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, 
it is difficult if not impossible for this court to conceive of a fact situation wherein a deviation 
is warranted. 
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that defendant Fire Insurance 
Exchange's Motion for New Trial or in the Alternative Remittitur is denied. 
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DATED this ^ c l a y of March, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to Form: 
STRONG & HANNI 
By: _ 
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Stephen J. Trayner 
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